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Morris: West Virginia Usury Law--Comments upon the 1968 and 1969 Acts

West Virginia Usury LawComments Upon the 1968 and 1969 Acts
William 0. Morris*
The West Virginia Legislature during the 1968 Second Session
and the General Session 1969 radically changed the laws of West
Virginia relating to permissive interest charges and penalties to be
imposed with respect to contracts calling for interest for the loan
or forbearance of money at a usurious rate.
The scope of this article is to cover problems relating to loans
made other than under the Small Loan Company Act or to corporate borrowers.
To constitute usury there must be a borrowing and lending with
an intent to exact more interest than is allowed by law or a forbearance in consideration of such interest being paid. Usury is interest
exceeding the lawful rate for the loan or forbearance of money, and
does not exist where such interest is essentially and honestly a part
of the consideration for the purchase of property, even though it be
called for in the form of a percentage on a principal sum, and be
called interest and be in excess of the lawful rate.'
It may be interesting to note that in Biblical times usury encompassed any transaction in which interest was charged. It did not
matter whether interest was charged in money or in kind.'
In West Virginia, the maximum interest rate which may be lawfully applied to an obligation under various factual situations is
prescribed by statute,3 as are the penalties which attach to a usurious
transaction.' It will be noted later that the latter statutory provision
is not applicable to loans made by a national bank which may be
usurious.
Under the 1968 revision of the West Virginia Code, which applies
to loans or forbearances made on or after September 14, 1968, the
*Professor of Law, West Virginia University
1 Reger v. O'Neal, 33 W.Va. 159, 166, 10 S.E. 375, 377 (1889).
2
Deuteronomy 23:19.
3
W. VA. CODE ch. 47, art. 6, § 5 (Michie Add. Supp. 1968). It should
be noted here that the first session of the fifty-ninth legislature made an
addition to this section. See W. VA. CODE ch. 47, art. 6, § 5a, Senate Bill No.
221 (March 6, 1969), dealing with interest charges on loans repayable in
installments.
4 W. VA. CODE ch. 47, art. 6, § 6 (Michie Add. Supp. 1968).
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legal rate of interest in West Virginia remains at six per cent per
annum.' The legal rate is the rate of interest which the law prescribes when an obligation calls for interest and the parties had not
agreed upon the rate of interest. Judgments on non-interest bearing
obligations likewise carry interest at the legal rate until paid.6 When

a judgment is obtained based on an obligation carrying a specified
rate of interest, the judgment should carry interest at the rate which
was applicable to the underlying indebtedness.! Non-interest bearing
obligations carry interest at the legal rate from the due date of the
obligation while interest bearing obligations continue to carry interest
at the agreed rate until the debt is actually paid.8
The 1968 law permits a higher rate of interest to be charged for
the loan or forbearance of money where the contract is in writing
than on an oral agreement. The Code revision reads in part, "No
person upon any contract other than a contract in writing shall take
for the loan or forbearance of money. . ."' interest in excess of six
dollars upon one hundred dollars for a year, and proportionately for
a greater or lesser sum, or for a longer or shorter period of time.
5W. VA. CODE ch. 47, art. 6, § 5 (Michie Add. Supp. 1968).
6In Shipman v. Baily the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals cited

with approval the case of Brooke v. Roan, 1 Call. 177, and stated:
[I]t was held that neither a forthcoming bond, nor the judgment could
change the rate of interest fixed by the original contract so as to make
the rate of interest conform to the law at the time the forthcoming bond
was made or the judgment was rendered.
In the case at bar the parties were competent to contract and they
did contract to pay interest on the debt at the rate of eight per cent.
from the date until paid. The rate was legal and authorized by the place
of contract and is, therefore, obligatory here. The rendition of a judgment or decree is not a payment of the debt; nor is it such a merger
of the original contract as will authorize the court to interfere with the
obligation of such contract requiring the parties to pay interest thereon
at the rate agreed upon by them. Shipman v. Baily, 20 W. Va. 140,
146-47 (1892).
See also
Pickins v. McCoy, 24 W. Va. 344, 353 (1994).
7
Shipman v. Baily, 20 W. Va. 140, 146-47 (1892); Pickins v. McCoy, 24
W. Va. 344, 353 (1884).
8The general rule of law in this, as in other jurisdictions, undoubtedly
is, that where the demand of the plaintiff is liquidated, or if unliquidated,
can be readily ascetrained by computation, as in this case, interest thereon will be allowed, if the demand is for work done or materials furnished,
from the time the material is furnished, or work completed, or from
the time when by the terms of the contract payment should have been
made. Bennett v. Federal Coal & Coke Co., 70 W. Va. 456, 459, 74
S.E. 418, 419 (1912).
See also Maim v. Central Trust Co., 127 W. Va. 795, 34 S.E.2d 742 (1945).
Where a contract to pay money does not provide for the payment of interest,
interest is computed only from the date the principal becomes due and
payable. Holt v. Holt, 96 W. Va. 337, 347, 123 S.E. 53, 56 (1924).
9W. VA. CODE ch. 47, art. 6, § 5 (Michie Add. Supp. 1968).
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This section further provides that parties to a loan of money or
forbearance agreement may contract in writing for the payment
of interest at a rate "not to exceed eight dollars upon one hundred
dollars for a year and proportionately for a greater or lesser sum,
or for a longer or shorter time, including points expressed as a percentage of the loan divided by the number of years of the loan
contract.""0
It is to be noted that in the aforementioned section the legislature
stated that "parties" may contract in writing for the payment of
interest at the rate of eight per cent per annum." When the legislature adopted the use of the word "parties" rather than "party"
did the legislature intend to state that the eight per cent annum
rate may only be charged when both the lender and borrower sign
a writing? Obviously the lender of money seldom signs anything
when making a loan nor is the lender contracting to pay. It is difficult to believe that the legislature intended to require both the lender
and borrower to be parties to and sign the writing in order for the
lender to lawfully charge the borrower interest in excess of six per
cent per annum, and the Supreme Court of Appeals is not likely to
so construe the language used. It would have been clearer had the
Legislature simply provided that one may in writing lawfully contract to pay interest not in excess of eight per cent per annum.
Many lending institutions follow the practice of deducting interest
charges on a loan at the time of making the loan. This form of
discounting is simply an alternate means of calculating and collecting interest in advance. In the majority of states such discounting
of loans at the maximum lawful interest rate is held not to be usurious, even though the transaction, because interest is paid in advance
of accrual, results mathmatically in an interest charge in excess of
the lawful rate and has generally become a recognized legal right.' 2
Some jurisdictions by statute forbid the taking of interest in advance.
In Evans v. National Bank,'" the United States Supreme Court stated
this to be the then rule in Georgia with respect to loans made by
'Old.

1 Id.

490 (1863); Columbia Nat. Life Ins. Co.
12 Goodrich v. Reynolds, 31 Ill.
v. Withers, 121 N.J.L. 54, 1 A.2d 436 (1938). This construction was applied
originally to the Statute of 12 Anne, Blackstone being of the view that
interest may lawfully be received beforehand for forbearing. Vahlberg v.
Keaton, 51 Ark. 534, 540, 11 S.W, P781 879 (1889).
"3 251 U.S, 108 (1919).
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a state bank. Some states hold that the practice must be limited
to commercial transactions.' 4 Generally, "[e]xpress authority given
to banks and other corporations by statute to reserve interest in
advance has been regarded as furnishing a strong implication that
other persons were not entitled to take interest in this way."' 5
The portion of the West Virginia statute dealing with the contract
rate of interest'6 makes no mention of the practice of deducting
interest in advance, although the 1969 addition authorized such
practice at a rate not in excess of six per cent per annum on installment loans. However, another statutory provision states that: "Any
banking institution authorized to do, and doing business in this State,
may contract for and charge for a secured or unsecured loan, repayable in installments, not in excess of six per cent per annum upon
the face amount of the instrument or instrument evidencing the obligation to repay the loan, for the entire period of the loan, and deduct
such charge in advance.... ."'I
However, the West Virginia Legislature amended the laws relating
to interest by a statute effective March 6, 1969, relating to interest
charges on installment loans.' 8 This amendment authorized the
lender and borrower to contract for the advance payment of interest
on an obligation repayable in installments, or to add to the amount
of the principal interest at a rate not to exceed six per cent per annum
on the principal amount of the instrument. In view of the fact the
draftsman used the phrase "principal amount of the instrument"
instead of "principal amount of the loan" one may infer that unless
the loan is evidenced by a writing one who lends money to be repaid
in installments is not entitled to deduct interest in advance.
The Code further provides that nothing contained in the Code
"shall be taken or construed as authorizing any charge or charges
of any kind or character, including interest, on installment loans by
the deduction thereof in advance or by adding the same to the
principal amount of the loan which singularly or together shall
exceed the six percent maximum provided for in this section. '1 9
This appears to mean that any costs or expenses incurred in making
' 4 See, e.g., Bank of Newport v. Cook, 60 Ark. 288, 30 S.W. 35 (1895).
15 55 AM. JTuR.
Usury § 41 n.9 (1946).
' 67 W. VA. CODE ch. 47, art. 6, § 5 (Michie Add. Supp. 1968).
' W. VA. CODE ch. 31A, art. 4, § 30, Senate Bill No. 176 (July 1, 1969).
18 W. VA. CODE ch. 47, art. 6, § 5a,Senate Bill No. 221 (March 6, 1969).
19 ld.
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the loan, such as recording fees, investigation fees, credit reports
cost and the like must be included in the six per cent figure.
Attention is directed to the fact that the Code now provides that
a banking institution may charge and collect a reasonable
amount to cover the expenses incurred in procuring reports
and information respecting loans and the value of and title to
property offered as security therefor, and a charge of three
dollars may be made for any loan or forbearance of money
or other things where the interest at the rate of six percent per
annum would not amount to that sum and the same shall not
be a usurious charge or rate of interest.2"
One must wonder why a banking institution, which specializes in
lending money may in any case charge three dollars for making
a loan while a non-banking institution or private individual may in
like instances only charge one dollar." No West Virginia case has
been found in which the Supreme Court of Appeals has considered
the validity of such practice. When considering the various provisions
of the West Virginia Code it appears that a private lender or state
chartered banking institution making single payment loans may not
lawfully deduct interest in advance if the amount deducted increases
the true interest charge so as to exceed six per cent per annum
interest upon an oral obligation or eight per cent per annum upon
written obligations.
Where a borrower signed an installment note for money loaned
by a banking institution and the interest is deducted by the bank
at the time the loan is made and the borrower prepays the obligation
"the bank shall make a refund or rebate of such charge in an amount
computed on the aggregate installments not due, at the original
contract rate of charge. . . ."" Attention is directed to the fact that

this statute places a duty only on a banking institution to adjust
interest charges in the event of prepayment of interest on prepayment
of the total obligation. Note that this applies only to state chartered
banks. 3 The Code imposes a duty upon any lender to make an
adjustment of interest charges in the event interest was deducted in
advance on an installment loan and the balance due was paid in
advance of due date. 4 The statute provides that "if the entire unpaid
20

W. VA.

ch. 31A, art. 4, § 30, Senate Bill No. 176 (July 1, 1969).
ch. 47, art. 6, § 5 (Michie Add. Supp. 1968).
CODE ch. 31A, art. 4, § 30, Senate Bill No. 176 (July 1, 1969).
CODE

2'1W. VA. CODE

22

W. VA.
Id.
24 W. VA.
23

CODE

ch. 47, art. 6, § 5a, Senate Bill No. 221 (March 6, 1969).
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balance outstanding on the loan is paid on any installment date,
prior to maturity, the lender shall make a refund or rebate of such
charge in an amount computed on the aggregate installments not due,
at the original contract rate of charge .. " While the language
used in the statutes is not clear, it does not appear that the Code
confers on the borrower the right to prepay the obligation and thus
have the interest adjusted on the installment obligation unless the
right to prepay the obligation had been reserved or granted.
In West Virginia, an installment note may contain an acceleration
clause without impairing the negotiable character of the instrument.26
The rights of a borrower to an adjustment of interest in the event the
due date of the obligation is accelerated in the event the interest has
been paid in advance is not covered by statute. It is not at all
uncommon for an installment note to provide that in the event of
default in the payment of any installment the entire obligation will
be due and owing either automatically or at the option of the holder
of the obligation. For example, suppose Mr. X borrowed $1,000.00
from F Bank. F Bank, at the time of making the loan, deducted
$60.00 interest from the $1,000.00 borrowed thus paying over to
Mr. X the amount of $940.00. Mr. X agreed to pay the F Bank
$1,000.00 in twelve equal monthly installments of $83.34. The
note evidencing the indebtedness contained a provision authorizing
the bank or holder of the note to accelerate the due date of all unpaid
installments in the event the borrower defaults in the payment of
any installment. Assume the borrower failed to pay the first installment when due and the holder of the note immediately sued the
maker of the note for $1,000.00. Is the plaintiff entitled to recover
interest for the full period of the loan in the event he accelerates
the due date of payment because of the borrower's default in the
payment of an installment? Does the borrower, whose default served
as the basis for the acceleration of the due date, forfeit any right to
an adjustment of interest paid by having defaulted in the payment of
one installment? There appears to be no West Virginia law on this
point. It is a fair interpretation of the statute to say that a bank
which made an installment loan on which interest was deducated
in advance is only under a duty to adjust interest charges when the
27
obligor makes payment "on any installment date, prior to maturity"
2

5 Id.
2

6W. VA. CODE

27

ch. 31A, art. 4, § 30, Senate Bill No. 176 (July 1, 1969).

1d.
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and is under no duty to adjust interest charged when the due date has
been accelerated because any payment made after the due date has
been accelerated is not made prior to maturity. It is possible that
the court may say that the lender is not entitled to retain interest
deducted at the time the loan was made for the full maturity period
in the event the due date is accelerated, for had the interest not
have been deducted in advance, the lender would only have been
entitled to interest at the agreed rate from the date of the loan until
the borrower actually paid his obligation. That is, if the lender
is unwilling to wait until the ultimate maturity date specified in the
instrument evidencing the obligation, he forfeits any claim to interest
for the period between the ultimate specified due date and the due
date resulting from the acceleration. The Legislature should clarify
this matter by legislation.
The language used with respect to adjustment of interest when the
obligation is paid in advance of the due date simply provides "the
bank shall make a refund or rebate .. ."" This apparently presupposes that the lending bank always retains the instrument evidencing the debt. To whom does the borrower look for an adjustment
of interest paid in advance on an installment note delivered to a
bank when the bank has passed it to a third party? Perhaps the
Legislature intended the rebate to be made by lending bank even
though it no longer owns the note. Otherwise, the value of an installment note payable to a banking institution on which the interest
had been deducted in advance and which contains a prepayment
privilege would be so uncertain as to adversely affect its marketability.
Perhaps the most radical change in the 1968 revision of the West
Virginia usury law29 relates to the severity of the penalty which now
attaches to a usurious transaction. The only penalty attaching to
a usurious contract prior to the 1968 revision was the loss of the
usurious portion of the interest."
By the 1968 revision of the law dealing with the penalty for usurious contracts, the lender of money who contracts to charge interest
28

29

1d.

W.

47, art. 6, §§ 5-6 (Michie Add. Supp. 1968).
47, art. 6, § 6 (Michie 1966) provided:
All contracts and assurances made directly or indirectly for the loan or
forbearance of money or other thing at a greater rate of interest than
six per cent, except where such greater rate is specially allowed by law,
shall be void as to any excess of interest agreed to be paid above that
rate, and no further except where otherwise specifically provided by law.
VA. CODE ch.

3oW. VA. CODE ch.
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in excess of the lawful rate may not collect any interest, but is limited
in his recovery to the principal sum remaining unpaid." The statute
further provides an additional deterrent in giving the borrower or
debtor the right to recover from the original lender or creditor or
other holder not in due course an amount equal to four times all
interest agreed to be paid and, in any event a minimum of one
hundred dollars. Again it should be noted this provision cannot be
applied to usurious loans made by a national bank.
Assuming, without argument, that the severity of the penal provisions with respect to a lender who charges more than the lawful
rate of interest is justified, the soundness of the penal provision with
respect to one who purchases the claim and who is not a holder
in due course is not at all clear.
Under the statute the borrower is not limited to a remedy against
the lender to whom he agreed to pay the usurious interest. The
borrower may proceed against the original lender, creditor or other
holder who fails to qualify as a holder in due course to recover from
such person four times all interest which he had agreed to pay and
in any event a minimum of one hundred dollars. Under the language
used in the act any purchaser of a nonnegotiable claim which is
tainted with usury, even though he is an innocent purchaser and is
unaware of the usury, is made liable to the borrower for the penal
sum. This necessarily follows for such party is a creditor and cannot be a holder in due course since one can only occupy such status
if he holds a negotiable instrument. The purchaser of a nonnegotiable
instrument cannot be a holder in due course.
If we assume that the instrument evidencing the debt is negotiable,
one may still purchase the instrument in good faith and fail to
qualify as a holder in due course, and be liable for the penalty
which attaches to a usurious transaction. The purchaser may be
totally innocent of any knowledge of the usury, as where the usurious
interest was deducted in advance and such fact did not appear on
the instrument, or where no mention of interest is made but is added
to the face amount of the instrument. If one purchases a negotiable
instrument after maturity or takes the instrument without proper
indorsements, he may not qualify as a holder in due course. The
statute leaves unanswered the question of whether one who traces his
31

W. VA. CODE Ch. 47, art. 6, § 6 (Michie Add. Supp. 1968).
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title through a holder in due course, is liable for the penal provisions
in the event the transaction is usurious.
Perhaps an example showing the severity of the penalty is in
order. One borrows $10,000.00 at nine per cent per annum to be
repaid in equal monthly installments over a twenty-year period. The
interest is to be paid monthly on the unpaid balance. At nine per
cent per annum the borrower would have agreed to pay interest
totalling $11,592.80 over the twenty-year period. As soon as the
contract is entered into the borrower is given a cause of action
against the lender for four times the amount of interest which he had
agreed to pay, or $46,371.20. In such a case, the borrower may pay
off the loan and have a profit of $36,371.20 from the usurious transaction.
In Reger v. O'Neal 2 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals,
in quoting from Norvell v. Hedrick,33 said with respect to a usurious
transaction: "It is well settled that as long as the debt is unpaid the
debtor can, if he see proper, have it applied as payment on the
debt. ''3 4 In view of the language used in the 1968 act, a borrower
who has agreed to pay interest at an usurious rate may in every case
have the lender's claim reduced by the amount to which he is entitled under the penal provisions of the act.
It may be interesting to speculate how the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals would apply the 1968 statute to a factual situation
as is found in Janes v. Felton.35 In the Janes case the plaintiff as a
condition to making a loan at the maximum lawful rate of interest
exacted from the defendant a promise to pay two judgments owed
by a third party to the plaintiff. The West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals stated, "It is well settled law that a contract is usurious
when any premium, profit, bonus, or charge, exacted or required
by the lender in excess of the money actually loaned which, in addition to the interest stipulated, renders the return to the lender greater
than the lawful rate of interest."36 Under the 1968 provision it
would seem that the borrower, under the facts of the Janes case,
would be entitled to recover four times the amount of the interest
which was agreed to be paid plus four times the amount of the
32
33

33 W. Va. 159, 10 S.E. 375 (1889).

21 W. Va. 523 (1883).

3433 W. Va.
3599 W. Va.
36 Id. at 415,

159, 165, 10 S.E. 375, 377 (1889).
407, 129 S.E. 482 (1925).
129 S.E. at 484.
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judgments which the borrower agreed to pay as a consideration for
the loan.
With respect to a note given in renewal of a usurious transaction
the renewal note is tainted with the usury of the prior note. As the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals said in Miller v. Banking
and Trust Co.:37 "A renewal of an usurious contract between the
same parties partakes of the infirmity of the original agreement. The
original taint attaches to all consecutive obligations or securities
growing out of the original vicious transaction. ...""
On more than one occasion the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals has stated that it is settled law in West Virginia that the
taint of usury will follow notes into the hands of purchasers for
value without actual notice of the usury. As the 1968 statute states,
"All contracts and assurances made directly or indirectly for the
loan or forbearance of money or other thing at a greater interest
than is permitted by law shall be void as to all interest provided
for in any such contract or assurance. . . ,"" and the borrower is
permitted to plead usury as a defense even against a holder in due
course. In Astrip v. Peters4" the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals said, "Under statutes expressly declaring usurious contracts
void, the defense of usury may be set up against a bona fide holder of
apparently valid negotiable paper. . . . The denial of recovery does
not go to the whole instrument unless the statute so provides, but
goes to the amount declared by law to be forfeited."" The Uniform
Commercial Code does not, by implication or otherwise, repeal,
limit or qualify in any degree or in any particular the statue relating
to usury. However, if the purchaser of a negotiable instrument tainted
with usury qualifies as a holder in due course of the instrument he
will not be liable for the penalty provided by the statute but will
simply be denied the right to recover any interest.
The West Virginia court has stated that the usury statute is based
on public policy and stands over and above any agreement between
the parties.42 If a contract is usurious in the first instance it cannot
be validated either by ratification or estoppel. The West Virginia
3763 W. Va. 107, 59 S.E. 977
31 Id. at 116, 59 S.E. at 980.
3
9 W. VA. CODE ch. 47, art. 6,

(1907).

§ 6 (Michie Add. Supp. 1968).
114 W. Va. 819, 174 S.E. 524 (1934).
41 Id. at 821, 174 S.E. at 525.
42
Hall v. Mortgage Sec. Corp. of America, 119 W. Va. 140, 147, 192
S.E. 145, 149 (1937).
40

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol71/iss3/10

10

Morris: West Virginia Usury Law--Comments upon the 1968 and 1969 Acts

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

Supreme Court of Appeals in Hall v. Mortgage Security Corporation
of America43 clearly expressed the public policy of this state with
respect to the application of the provisions of a usury statute when
it said: "Because the usury statute is based upon public policy,
necessarily it is arbitrary and should not be set aside haphazardly or
because of sympathy.""
The West Virginia statute also makes allowance for a bona fide
mistake which results in making the obligation usurious. It provides
that "[e]very usurious contract and assurance shall be presumed to
have been wilfully made by the lender or creditor, but a bona fide
error, innocently made, which causes such contract or assurance
to be usurious shall not constitute a violation of this section if the
lender or creditor shall rectify the error within fifteen days after
receiving notice thereof."45
The burden of proof of usury is on the party who alleges it. It
has been stated that usury must be proven beyond any ground for
fair questioning.
The 1968 interest statute retains the provision from the prior act
that permits one entitled to interest to any loan or forbearance of
money to charge one dollar for such loan or forbearance without
being guilty of usury even though this amount exceeds the otherwise
permissive charge for the loan or forbearance.
By the express provisions of the West Virginia statute, banking
institutions are expressly authorized to make charges for making a
loan to cover the expenses incurred in procuring reports and information respecting loans and the value of and title to property offered as
security therefor in addition to the maximum lawful interest
charges.46
In Liskey v. Snyder,4" by the way of dicta the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia recognized that a private lender may "upon
strict and full proof, such as to preclude the existence of any shift
or device to evade the statute against usury, . . . be allowed any

just and reasonable expenses incurred by [him] in making [his]
loan, and not already paid by the defendant."4 8 The court appears to
43

d.

44Id. at 149, 192 S.E. at 150.
45
W. VA. CODE ch. 47, art. 7,
46
W. VA. CODE ch. 31A, art.
47 56 W. Va. 610, 49 S.E. 515
481d. at 641, 49 S.E. at 528.

§ 6 (Michie Add. Supp. 1968).
4, § 30, Senate Bill No. 176 (July 1, 1969).
(1904).
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be saying that a lender may lawfully charge the borrower the cost
of making the loan in addition to the maximum lawful interest rate.
While the authorized maximum interest rate set forth in West
Virginia"' is applicable to laws made by national banks doing business in this state,"0 the penal provisions for usury' are not applicable
to usurious loans made by a national bank doing business in this
state. The penal provisions applicable to usurious loans made by
a national bank are controlled by federal law. 2
The West Virginia usury statute is silent as to any statute of
limitations on the borrower's cause of action for the penal sum provided for in the act. Should the period of the statute of limitations
begin to run from the date of making the agreement or should it
begin to run from the date of the last payment? This issue should
be clearly resolved by legislation. The federal act does provide
a statute of limitations with respect to claims against a national
bank. 3 The state statute should do no less.
In order to assure equality of opportunity between state chartered
banks and national banks with respect to charges which a national
bank may make for loaning money Congress enacted the following
provision:
Any association may take, receive, reserve, and charge on
any loan or discount made, or upon any notes, bills of exchange,
or other evidences of debt, interest at the rate allowed by the laws
of the State, Territory, or District where the bank is located, or
at a rate of 1 per centum in excess of the discount rate on ninetyday commercial paper in effect at the Federal reserve bank in the
Federal Reserve District where the bank is located, whichever may
be the greater, and no more, except where by the laws of any
State a different rate is limited for banks organized under State
laws, the rate so limited shall be allowed for associations organ54
ized or existing in any such State under this chapter.
This section permits national banks to take, receive reserve and
charge on any loan or discount the rate of interest allowed by the
laws of the state in which it is located subject to the provision re49

W. VA. CODE ch. 47, art. 6, § 5 (Michie Add. Supp. 1968).
W. VA. CODE ch. 47, art. 6, § 6 (Michie Add. Supp. 1968).
52 12 U.S.C. § 86 (1964).
50 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1964).
51

53
54

Id.

12 U.S.C. § 85 (1964).
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specting the Federal Reserve discount rate in the event it should
be higher than the maximum interest rate permitted by state law."
State laws relating to interest charges, only in so far as they
establish the maximum rate of interest which may be lawfully
charged, are applicable to loans or discuonts made by a national
bank.56 The rate of interest which a national bank may lawfully
charge is established by federal law, although it is for the most part
measured in each instance by the laws of the state in which it is
engaged in business. 7
Attention is again called to the fact that the applicable statutory
provisoin sets forth the maximum interest in advance. 6 As
previously stated, there is an applicable provision for interest
deduction in advance by a banking institution on an installment
loan. 9 The above provision is only applicable to state chartered
banking institutions. Congress has enacted legislation which controls
loans made by a national bank, and provides the bank may "take,
receive, reserve, and charge on any loan or discount made" interest at
the rate allowed by the laws of the state." In reading the federal
and state provisions together the court of this state may say that a
limitation appearing in the state statute with respect to deducting
interest in advance applies only to installment loans made by a
banking institution chartered under the laws of this state, while a
national bank, may deduct interest in advance upon any loan by
such bank at the maximum rate permitted by the laws of the state
in which it operates."' If this be true then it follows that a national
bank is in a preferred position with respect to this matter.
The legislative history of the National Bank Act clearly shows that
the national policy as established by Congress is to keep the matter
of penalties to be assessed against a national bank for contracting for
or receiving usurious interest in the exclusive control of Congress.2
The Alabama court in Slaughter v. First Nat. Bank63 considered
-s Tiffany v. Nat'l Bank of Missouri, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409 (1873).
56

12 U.S.C. § 85 (1964).

57

Union Nat'l Bank v. Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ry., 163 U.S.

325, 331
(1896).
58
W. VA.

-9
60
61
62

CODE ch.

47, art. 6, § 5 (Michie Add. Supp. 1968).

W. VA. CODE ch. 31A, art. 4, § 30, Senate Bill No. 176 (July 1, 1969).
12 U.S.C. § 85 (1964).
Id.
Morris, The Laws of Usury as Applied to National Banks, 32 U. Mo,

AT KANSAS Crry L. Rsv. 193, 197 (1964).
63 109 Ala. 157,
19 So. 430 (1896).
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an Alabama statute which made it a misdemeanor for any banker
to discount commercial paper at a higher rate than eight per annum and held that it did not apply to national banks.
Section 86 of Title 12 of the United States Code provides specific
penalties which may be assessed against a national bank which has
contracted for or has collected interest on loans or discounts in
excess of the rate permitted by Section 85 of Title 12. The text
of Section 86 is as follows:
The taking, receiving, reserving, or charging a rate of interest
greater than is allowed by the preceding section, when knowingly done, shall be deemed a forfeiture of the entire interest
which the note, bill, or other evidence of debt carries with it,
or which has been agreed to be paid thereon. In case the
greater rate of interest has been paid, the person by whom it
has been paid, or his legal representatives, may recover back,
in an action in the nature of an action of debt, twice the
amount of interest thus paid from the association taking or
receiving the same: Provided, That such action is commenced
within two years from the time the usurious transaction occurred....
Section 86 takes into account two factual situations: first, where the
usurious interest has not actually been paid by the borrower, but has
been contracted for; and secondly, where the usurious interest has
in fact been paid by the borrower.
The New York court in Schlesinger v. Gilhooly64 recognized the
supremacy of the federal act with respect to national banks which
had engaged in usurious practices by saying:
[T]he principle that national banks are not subject to state
legislation without the permission of Congress, and that the
national banking act covers the entire subject of usury and
forfeitures therefor, so far as such banks are concerned, when
considered in connection with the parity clause of our state's
banking act, necessarily controls the decision in this case .... 15
In Evans v. National Bank of Savannah6 the United States
Supreme Court decided that when the rate of interest prescribed by
189 N.Y. 1, 81 N.E. 619 (1907).
at 11, 81 N.E. at 622.
66251 U.S. 108 (1919).
64

6

-1d.
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state law is not exceeded, the provisions of the National Banking
Act are satisfied, although there is an advance charge of interest, and
the transaction is not tainted with usury merely because such advance
interest deduction would have been usurious under state statute.
The United States Supreme Court quoted with approval the following statement found in Flickner v. Bank: "
It has always been supposed, that an authority to discount,
or make discounts, did, from the very force of the terms, necessarily include an authority to take the interest in advance.
And this is not only the settled opinion among professional
and commercial men, but stands approved by the soundest
principles of legal construction ....
Associations organized under the National Bank Act are
plainly empowered to discount promissory notes in the ordinary course of business. To discount, ex vi termini, implies
reservation of interest in advance; and, under the ancient and
commonly accepted doctrine, when dealing with short-time
paper such a reservation at the highest interest rate allowed by
law is not usurious. Recognizing prevailing practice in business
and the above state doctrine concerning usury, we think Congress intended to endow national banks with the power, which
banks generally exercise, of discounting notes reserving charges
at the highest rate permitted for interest. 8

U.S. (8 Wheat.) 338, 354 (1823).
Evans v. Natl Bank of Savannah, 251 U.S. 108, 114 (1919).

6721
6
1
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